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OLEXANDER RAZUMKOV'S TEAM: BOTH THE AUTHORITIES AND THE NATION ARE SHORT OF BREATH WITHOUT FRESH IDEAS
28 October 2000
Against the background of a systematic crisis in society, a question arises about the ability of the Ukrainian elite to generate new ideas, put forward constructive proposals for the
authorities and contribute to their implementation. The world knows an effective mechanism for employing intellectual potential in solving issues of national importance. This
mechanism is known as the non-governmental analytical centers, also known as a "think tanks".
The editors of Zerkalo Nedeli invited Anatoliy GRYTSENKO, President of the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies (UCEPS). In accordance with a decision taken by
the founders' meeting, from October 24, 2000 the Centre bears the name of its founder and late head Olexander Vasyliovych RAZUMKOV. A former Deputy Secretary of Ukraine's
National Security and Defence Council (NSDC), a great friend and permanent contributor to our newspaper, Mr. Razumkov is commemorated today, on the first anniversary of his
death, by his relatives, close friends and colleagues.
In November 1999, Mr. Razumkov's team had to leave the corridors of power, and this was not for the first time. None of the civil and military servants who convined in the lobby
with dumb telephones held any illusions as to the feasibility of their new aim of creating a powerful centre and continuing the direction of the man they had up until now
laconically called "Chief". A man who was USEFUL to his country and FAITHFUL to it. A country whose many citizens, would perhaps realise that it is possible to WORK IN SUCH A
MANNER as part of official Ukraine, only after watching the airing on Sunday (11 pm) by "1+1" TV of Olha Herasymyuk's film. And to wage SUCH a life.
Anatoliy GRYTSENKO, born in 1957; ethnic Ukrainian; education - Kyiv Suvorov Military High School (1974), Kyiv Higher Military Aviation
Engineering School (1979), Defence Language Institute, U.S. Department of Defence (1993), the US Air War College (1994), Academy of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine (1995). Candidate of Technical Sciences, senior research fellow, author of more than 100 scholarly works,
some of them issued in Belgium, the Netherlands, the USA, Germany and Switzerland. Since 1997 - a permanent contributor to Zerkalo
Nedeli. Colonel (Retired) with a 25-year of active service. Served in a combat unit, worked as an instructor at a higher military school, as a
staff officer at the Defence Ministry, headed the Military Security and Defence Studies Division at the General Staff Research Centre. His
most recent position in state bodies - Head of the Analytical Service of Ukraine's NSDC Staff. Since December, 1999 - UCEPS President.
- Mr. Grytsenko, the first period of UCEPS intense activity occurred in 1995-1997, after Olexander Razumkov left the Presidential Administration. Please tell us a few words about
this period.
- In my opinion, Olexander Razumkov chose the most productive way for a top executive to leave public service for one or another reason. He did not go in tough opposition to
the authorities, did not jump into party building, did not want to become one of 450 MPs, did not engage in business as most former ministers, premiers and vice premiers do.
Î.Razumkov created his Centre, formed his team and continued working for the state in a non-governmental organisation. This work continued under strong pressure from those in
the President's surroundings who could not tolerate a "rare bird" in the flock. The Centre overcame its obstacles, and its leader soon took up another high position. In that period,
UCEPS tackled acute problems that were taboo for many: the shadow economy, corruption, organised crime, military reform. Today, many people speak about this…
- Yes, they do. These problems are as topical as before. What do you think hinders Ukraine's overcoming the crisis, why have we been "extinguishing the fire" for so long and have
not been able to find the right way?
- Your question contains the answer: exactly because we are "fire-fighting" and are not looking at least half a step ahead. One of the reasons lies in the absence of an integral
system of information support for the government, strategic analysis and forecasting in the country. This is manifested in the low effectiveness of the executive branch;
unreadiness of Parliament to put forward serious initiatives; and a lack of well-founded, revolutionary proposals or simply fresh ideas in the programmes of parliamentary and
presidential candidates. Even the headquarters of political parties lavishly funded by their founders have failed to propose feasible programmes in the main spheres of governance.
The crisis bears not a local but a systematic character. We cannot go on this way: the state leadership is short of breath without fresh air, and the entire country can suffocate.
The shortage of systemic analysts is especially felt in state structures. There are few of them in central staff, and the situation at departmental research institutions is not much
better. The humiliatingly low remuneration of a qualified expert is not the only problem. Unfortunately, there are very few specialists in the country (in some branches - literally a
handful), who are ready for responsible work, even if it is decently remunerated. Thousands of doctors and candidates of sciences are of little help here, since most of them are
either unable or unwilling to adopt up-to-date methods of analysis, unprepared to resolve applied problems and produce analytical products on short deadlines. Such people should
be deliberately trained, and available "brain potential" requires care.
- Is the situation really so bad?
- Both yes and no. Some "analytical islands" have remained in the special services, the intelligence community, and certain tireless workaholics work in the staff of ministries and
structures servicing certain high-ranking officials, but they are divided, lack a single methodology, and their proposals are emasculated (suspended, lost) at different levels of the
state pyramid. That's why it's hard to speak about systemic efforts bringing noticeable practical results.
A significant "brain" potential remains outside of the state bodies - such kernels are to be found in the headquarters of certain political parties, leading mass media, non-
governmental analytical centres, and certain business structures. Furthermore, hundreds of experienced and qualified experts who for one or another reason have left public
service are working not in accordance with their qualifications or are completely un-involved in socially beneficial activities.
The state is unable to employ this potential, but this can be done by strong non-governmental organisations: they are more mobile and have more opportunities to attract funds
from sponsors. In Ukraine, there are small teams of 10-15 people that produce several times more analytical products than state-owned scientific-research institutions employing
100-150 people, occupying many-storied buildings in the capital, operating regional branches and receiving decent budget financing. It is just as small businesses that leave behind
sluggish and unprofitable public enterprises. Supporting such think tanks is in the interest of the state.
- Is the analytical product of these think tanks in demand by the authorities?
- There are many non-governmental analytical centres in the country: in the capital alone, more than fifty formally exist. Unfortunately, few of them are working actively. Many
structures exist on paper, have no permanent staff and possess inadequate resources. Some experts are employed at three or five organisations, which do not bring a full return
on resources invested in them. Such think tanks bring minimum benefits for the state.
That's why we should speak only about those centres, which can perform research on an adequate level along several directions. There are a few such entities in Ukraine. In our
opinion, potentially strong analytical structures include the Agency for Humanitarian Technologies (Volodymyr Granovsky), the International Centre for Policy Studies (Vira
Nanivska), and the Centre for Economic Development (Îleksandr Paskhaver). Sociological surveys performed at the Institute of Politics (Ìykola Tomenko) and the Kyiv Centre of
Political Research and Conflictology (Ìykhailo Pohrebynskyi) deserve attention as well.
Non-governmental centres are effective provided two conditions are met: their efforts are supported by the mass media, and that the authorities are receptive to alternative
proposals.
We are grateful to the national mass media for their attention to the activities of the Razumkov Centre. Actually every day journalists turn to us for comments on events, expert
assessments and forecasts, supporting data, and sociological surveys results. At the same time, we know about publications where any mention of the Centre and the names of its
experts are taboo. We realise that this is not the position of the journalists themselves, and know who stands behind such decisions. Hiding one's head in the sand is for the
weak, they deserve only condolences…
- And what about the authorities?
- We have positive experience that confirms the authorities' readiness to co-operate with NGOs, and this gives reason for optimism. Let me cite some examples.
Last April, UCEPS prepared the analytical report "Reform of the Insurance System in Ukraine: Conceptual Background". Prime-Minister Victor Yushchenko found the time to
acquaint himself with it. According to his decision, a working group was formed that involved representatives of the Ministry of Finance, other ministries and agencies and, finally,
experts representing non-government structures - UCEPS and the League of Insurance Companies of Ukraine. Several months of joint efforts resulted in the drafting of the State
Programme for Ukraine's Insurance Market Development through 2005. The draft has been agreed with all ministries and is waiting for a political decision - approval by the
Cabinet of Ministers - to be taken.
A month ago, UCEPS presented the analytical report "The Church and Society in Ukraine: Problems of Relationship". Our experts prepared it in close co-operation with the State
Committee of Ukraine for Religious Affairs. Our analysis was highly praised by the leaders of religious confessions and the Head of the Presidential Administration, Volodymyr
Lytvyn.
In March the report "International Image of Ukraine: Myths and Realities" we proposed expanding the DINAU news agency network beyond the country's borders - this September,
the Government adopted a relevant resolution.
In February the report "Military Reform in Ukraine: the Start or Another False Start?", UCEPS substantiated incorporation of the Chief of the General Staff into the NSDC - in July,
the President signed the relevant decree, and General Shkidchenko is now working in the Council. This means that the authorities take public opinion into account.
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In February the report "Military Reform in Ukraine: the Start or Another False Start?", UCEPS substantiated incorporation of the Chief of the General Staff into the NSDC - in July,
the President signed the relevant decree, and General Shkidchenko is now working in the Council. This means that the authorities take public opinion into account.
There are other forms of mutually beneficial co-operation, too. For instance, in recent months, meetings involving leaders of non-governmental centres have been held in the
Presidential Administration at the initiative of Mr. Lytvyn. The presidential team expressed a readiness to consider independent assessments of the situation, even very tough and
alternative ideas and proposals. It's an extremely important message for us, and we prepare for such meetings very seriously, being aware of our responsibility.
Of course, problems exist. For instance, we have failed to establish effective co-operation with Yevhen Marchuk so far, and not through our own fault. Before leaving the NSDC, I
considered it my duty to tell the newly-appointed Secretary about possible ways of raising the effectiveness of the NSDC Staff, first of all - of its information and analysis
components. We met with Mr. Marchuk last December, and I was sure that our meeting had been a success. First, instead of the planned twenty minutes, the meeting lasted an
hour and twenty minutes. Second, at meeting's end, Mr. Marchuk said that my assessments coincided 100 percent with his views, including with respect to possible appointments.
Finally, we agreed to maintain working contacts between experts of the NSDC Staff and UCEPS, since it is simpler to solve issues important for the country through joint efforts (of
governmental and non-governmental structures). Unfortunately, these words dangled in mid-air. I can hardly guess why Mr. Marchuk rejected co-operation with our Centre. I
believe this to be bad for our common cause. That's why we are open as before for a dialogue leading to constructive co-operation.
- Why are reasonable ideas accepted rather rarely?
- A new good idea travels a difficult path: flat rejection - understanding - acceptance - implementation. In many cases, this path is blocked at the early stages. Everything
depends on the power structures' ability to take responsible decisions and demonstrate political will in the course of their implementation. If the urgency of a problem is realised
too late, momentum is lost, than we have to "extinguish the fire". Sometimes, there is enough political will only for decision-making. Meanwhile, executive structures not always
carry out the will of the superior, since they operate according to Parkinson's laws. Let me cite some examples personally known to me.
The NSDC Staff has long come out with proposals on many issues that are of concern to the state leadership. As far as I know, in the near future, an NSDC meeting will be held
devoted to Ukraine's energy policy at the intersection of Russian and West European interests. But Olexander Razumkov proposed an NSDC meeting with such an agenda as early
as two and a half years ago - in April, 1998. Declarations of Ukraine's co-operation within the framework of GUUAM, NATO, the EU, with strategic partners also need to be backed
with practical deeds. Well-grounded solutions for these issues were offered to the President as far back as 1998-1999. It is worth noting that relevant decisions were adopted: the
documents bear the resolution "Agree. For Implementation", and were addressed to specific ministers. Had the Government carried out the instructions of the head of state, many
problems would have been resolved in a timely fashion.
By the way, half a year prior to the economic crisis that occurred in September, 1998, Îlexander Razumkov warned of the real external threats and the internal preconditions for
the collapse of Ukraine's economy, and outlined the possible scenarios of crisis development proceeding from an analysis of the Indonesian situation. These forecasts were not
properly considered by the Government either. As a result, in September, 1998, we had to hastily work out a list of anti-crisis measures and again "extinguish the fire".
I do not want you to think that nobody, with the exception of Olexander Razumkov, forecasted the development of the situation and proposed possible decisions. This was not so.
I have a very special attitude to that person, I am grateful to Fate for the opportunity of working side by side with him. He really was a top-class systemic analyst, and in a
difficult situation could synthesise the whole picture and propose a solution ahead of others. An unbiased observer cannot but notice that along the three directions which
Î.Razumkov was in charge of in NSDC - Ukrainian-Russian relations, working with the Left factions in the Verkhovna Rada and inter-confessional relations - the situation after his
death became seriously aggravated and began developing in the direction of a violent, rather than compromise, scenarios. Am I not right? By the way, a well-known Western
diplomat, who had worked in Ukraine for many years, during his visit to UCEPS last week frankly said that he knows only few people in our country whose potential is comparable
to that of Îlexander Razumkov. I am sure that at the present moment, President Leonid Kuchma needs such people in his team as never before.
The ultimate conclusion is evident: executive structures should work for the future, the policy of "extinguishing the fire" leads to a deadlock fraught with grave miscalculations and
losses for the country. I am sure that every body of state power with a staff of 100 should employ 5-7 analysts, to forecast the situation two to three moves in advance. Today
this is absent; moreover, every next cut often brings reduction of information and analysis divisions.
For instance, last January the NSDC staff was cut by 40 people: the Analytical Service, Information Security Division, and the Division of Socio-political Aspects of National Security
were all cut. What for? We saved a few kopecks, but the losses will be substantial.
- It is evident that you are not indifferent to the fate of the NSDC Staff. Did you ever wish to return to public service?
- Indeed, I am not indifferent to the organisation where I was employed just a year ago, but I can frankly tell you that I never wish to come back there. First of all, today, the
NSDC Staff has a much lower profile, its influence on state decision-making is limited. I don't want to sit on the results of my work. Second, I do not see any strong personalities
in the NSDC leadership comparable with Volodymyr Horbulin and Îlexander Razumkov by their qualification and influence. I can spare no efforts working for a true leader, an
honest person who is much stronger, better qualified, if you like - cleverer than I am. Finally, it's easy to understand but impossible to accept the present style of "co-ordination
and control" - those endless intrigues, quarrels on the tapes of news agencies, TV screens and pages of controlled newspapers, involving high-ranking Government officials and the
NSDC Secretary. We worked in a difficult situation, too, since boundaries between Leonid Kuchma, Volodymyr Horbulin and Îlexander Razumkov had never been straight; from the
very beginning it was a triangle whose configuration changed depending on the situation. However, the key issues were resolved quite successfully. Instead, today the two political
structures (the Government and the NSDC Staff) that should be working together are engaged in "political cannibalism".
In principle, I cannot rule out that any of UCEPS employees will be offered an executive position in the state structures. Under certain circumstances such an offer may be
accepted. We are interested in the effectiveness of work, and this requires accumulating a critical mass of genuine professionals, who are devoted to the country and whom its
future can be entrusted, on all levels of the executive pyramid.
- Do independent experts always have the chance to present their thoughts to decision-makers?
- It is difficult for me to speak on behalf of other NGOs. As a rule, we do not experience problems with this, although you are right - not all doors open at the first stroke.
There are officials who consider it humiliating to consult experts from non-governmental analytical centres. Their assistants plainly say that, say, Ivan Ivanovych is occupied doing
more important business and cannot waste his time meeting some experts, you should understand - he heads a ministerial section (department)! What can we say about this?
First of all, some of the UCEPS employees up until recently have worked in executive structures. Such people as Valeriy Chaly, Volodymyr Saprykin, Mykola Sungurovskyi and ²hor
Zhdanov occupied no less or maybe even more important posts than those "Ivan Ivanovychs". Their assessments and proposals were presented to state leaders, and important
decisions were taken on their basis. Second, we are not budget-financed and are not chumming anyone. We offer the authorities our analysis of the situation, a forecast of its
development and possible solutions. The Razumkov Centre has always supported constructive initiatives of the authorities and simultaneously criticised weak or erroneous
solutions that can produce negative consequences. Where we criticise state power bodies for certain actions (or inaction), we always propose a solution and are ready to
contribute to its practical implementation. We believe this to be a responsible civic position of people not indifferent to developments in this country.
Indeed, many our employees are maximalists. We want the situation in the country to change for the better while we are alive, not in 100-150 years. That's why we are using all
channels of influence accessible to NGOs.
- What are the financial arrangements of analytical centres? In other words, who calls the tune?
- All over the world, such structures are categorised as non-profit entities, and their activity is supported by sponsors - legal entities, individuals and international organisations. In
developed countries "think tanks" perform government contracts, in the process obtaining additional funds from state budget.
As far as the Razumkov Centre is concerned, the lion's share of financial support comes from those representatives of national business who share the views and ideas of
Olexander Razumkov. UCEPS is not backed by leaders of political parties or those who are called oligarchs in this country. Like other non-governmental centres, we obtain financial
support for some projects from foreign funds and organisations.
Those include the Konrad Adenauer and Friedrich Ebert Foundations, the Renaissance Foundation, the Embassies of Great Britain and the Netherlands, and the NATO Information
and Documentation Centre. Some studies are ordered by executive structures. We do not count on budget funding, although we do not rule out such in the future, when our state
becomes more prosperous.
We rely on information support from state government bodies, People's Deputies of Ukraine, mass media, embassies and missions of foreign countries, and our partners outside
Ukraine. We determine the subjects of research by ourselves and only then search for persons who could sponsor them.
Anticipating your next question, I tell you: no sponsor has ever imposed his approaches or assessments on us. There were such attempts on the part of one of the Western
funds, but we defended our position and completed the project as we considered fit.
Îlexander Razumkov set very high requirements for the analytical product offered by the Centre, and we have no moral right to lower these requirements. This imposes some
limitations on our relations with partners and sponsors: UCEPS takes on only those projects, which we can do better than others, and draw concrete proposals and
recommendations from our survey. We have studied the practice of non-governmental centres in dozens of countries, defined our strategy and adhere to it.
- And what is the essence of UCEPS strategy?
Cl
ick
 to
 bu
y N
OW
!
PD
F-XChange
w
ww.docu-track
.co
m C
lic
k t
o b
uy
 N
OW
!
PD
F-XChange
w
ww.docu-track
.co
m
Seite 3"Ukraine on the road to European integration: achievements, problems and prospects" (round table) — Raz...
28.05.2009 15:49:32http://www.uceps.org/eng/print.php?lng=ENG&&news_id=99&&address=article
- And what is the essence of UCEPS strategy?
- Well, I cannot tell you about all our secrets, since we have competitors… Speaking seriously, it is possible to distinguish four main elements of our strategy.
First of all is the level of analysis that corresponds to world standards. Professionals have always been the main advantage of Razumkov's team. He managed to find talented
people, created advantageous conditions for their creative work, and he taught patiently, allowing one to learn from one's mistakes. UCEPS has always cherished an atmosphere of
implication of important and serious affairs, and in such conditions people demonstrate their best traits. Most important of all, Îlexander Razumkov always defended his team from
the blows of fate and bureaucrats; after Razumkov's death we keenly felt how safe we had been behind his back. In my opinion, few of our politicians have learned to create
workable teams; instead, examples are many of credulous adherents betrayed without compunction (all together or one after another), if the leader finds himself in a tough
situation or suddenly shows his true colours and changes his views to the contrary, chasing a new political phantom.
Our experts are capable of writing not only 100-page thick monographs but also analytical reports on two or three pages, deserving the attention of the top leaders of the state
(which is much more difficult). They used to do this job in the Presidential Administration, the NSDC Staff, the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff, Government structures.
That's why analytical materials of the Centre are usually highly praised by domestic and foreign experts.
Second, UCEPS performs research along not one or two but several directions at a time - domestic policy, legislation, economy, energy policy, foreign policy, regional security, the
military sector, and social problems. Multi-dimensional analysis and joint work "in-between" enrich experts, permit them to take into account more factors and raise the quality of
the final product. We are trying to move away from assessments and forecasts "hot on the trail". Our niche is more serious analytical material that will be of interest both in a
year and in 5-10 years. This is the way the RAND Corporation of the USA works, and we are attempting to adopt the experience of that powerful "think tank". It's not difficult to
confirm that UCEPS analytical reports prepared in 1995-1998 (on defence reform, inter-confessional relations, the shadow economy) have not lost their validity.
We pay attention to professional assessments of our work, for we can make mistakes, too. For instance, we accepted very seriously the thoughts of former U.S. Secretary of
Defense William Perry and General John Shalikashvili on defence reform (they highly praised the UCEPS materials). But when instead of arguments we hear senseless epithets like
"shoddy strategists", "so-called experts" or "irresponsible populists", we feel upset, but not for long: time will show who was right and who was wrong.
The third element of the strategy is the publication of our own monthly magazine. We named it "National Security & Defence". It bears materials pertaining to various spheres of
Ukraine's national security: political, economic, social, environmental, military, science and technology, and information. With a circulation of 1,500 copies (in Ukrainian and in
English), UCEPS can make its ideas known to presidential and Governmental structures, every People's Deputy of Ukraine, concerned ministries and agencies, leading universities,
domestic and foreign experts.
The magazine has been published since January 2000, but it has been noticed in Ukraine and beyond its borders. We receive requests to mail the magazine to dozens of countries
(from Britain to Japan, from South Africa to Malaysia), to leading world universities. We are glad to know that the Razumkov Centre's experts are quoted in serious foreign
publications. There seem to be reasons for being pleased. On the whole, however, it is sad that only one non-governmental centre in the country has managed to organise a
monthly edition of its own analytical magazine. Apart from our magazine, today, there is no other monthly publication in the domain of national security and defence (even with
account of state research structures). The closest analogue - the NSDC publication Stratehichna Panorama ("Strategic Review"), prepared by two powerful institutes - is published
quarterly, in the best case scenario. It is worth thinking over…
Fourth, we have created our own sociological service and conduct monthly polls in all of Ukraine's 27 regions. We always know what worries our citizens the most and how people
assess actions by the authorities. For instance, we know that people care least of all about macro indicators: GDP growth, industrial output, inflation level, average salary increase
rate, etc. Instead, everyone cares what he can afford with his salary, how much it will cost to prepare a first-former (first-grader) for school, what share of salary is used to pay
for housing, transport, utilities and foodstuffs. Sociology complements our analysis and makes it much stronger. It allows us to better feel the problems of the people for whom we
are working, in the end. Besides, the mechanism of national polls helps us to assess the level of public support for our own proposals. Such feedback is very useful for UCEPS
experts.
- The UCEPS magazine publishes materials by experts representing, so to speak, polar political forces that often strongly criticise the present authorities. Is this done intentionally
or through negligence?
- Indeed, we allow the pages of the National Security & Defence for the thoughts and assessments of different people. Those included Yuriy Yekhanurov, Viktor Medvedchuk,
Heorhiy Kriuchkov, Natalia Vitrenko, Borys Kozhyn, Roman Zvarych, Inna Bohoslovska, Valeriy Shmarov, Anatoliy Lopata, ²van Bilas, ²gor Îstash, ²hor Êîliushko, Volodymyr
Horbulin, Borys Tarasyuk, and Ànatoliy Ê³nakh. We can also mention the names of well-known Western experts - Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jeffrey Sachs, Sherman Garnett, James
Sherr, Jeffrey Simon, - with whose estimates not everyone in Ukraine agrees.
For us, the main criterion is the quality of material and the depth of argumentation. The UCEPS magazine won't publish unfounded accusations and humiliating attacks. We reject
publications that term the present authorities as "an anti-popular gangster regime", without putting forward any constructive proposals. At the same time, we do not evade sharp
discussion and are not afraid to compare thoughts, ideas and propositions - such was the firm position of Îlexander Razumkov, and we adhere to it. It's no secret that few mass
media in the country can present the situation as it is in reality. When working in the NSDC Staff, we monitored 80-90 newspapers and magazines, and continue to do this now,
but few of them deserve attention. Television reports increasingly resemble the times of stagnation, although there are more than a hundred political parties in the country instead
of one, and there is no Ministry of Truth within the Government structure. What are we afraid of?
On the eve of the 1998 parliamentary elections, UCEPS held a round-table to discuss economic programmes of political parties battling for parliamentary seats. Let me remind you
that Îleksander Razumkov at that time was not only the leader of the Centre but also occupied an executive position in the NSDC. His colleagues in the presidential team, to put it
mildly, did not recommend him to give a rostrum to the Left, which criticised the authorities. It does credit to Îleksander Razumkov that he assumed all the responsibility for the
possible consequences, but did not betray the principles to which his Centre adhered and continues to adhere. As a result, the round-table involved not only the parties associated
with pro-presidential forces, but also the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU), and the Peasant Party
of Ukraine. And nothing terrible happened, quite the contrary. People saw the readiness of the authorities to carry on an open dialogue, mass media obtained the chance to
discuss the parties known to the voters, and experts - to assess the substantiation of proposals and the depth of populism of those who criticise but are unable to propose
anything.
We are firmly convinced that Ukraine's domestic policy and relations with other countries should be built on a solid foundation, take account of realistic capabilities and limitations,
including the spirits of broad masses of the population. And since the CPU, SPU and PSPU enjoy the support of millions of voters, the policy of the country's leadership, as well as
the policies of other countries toward Ukraine, should take this factor into account. Otherwise we will find ourselves in a world of illusions, incorrect assessments and forecasts,
overstated expectations and unjustified hopes, which neither we, nor our partners need.
- Sometimes UCEPS experts boldly speak in public, producing assessments that are not to everybody's liking. Do you feel any "special attention" to the Centre on the part of
supervisory bodies or special services?
- You ask point-blank, but I will give you a direct answer. Our personnel have sufficient experience of working in this country and abroad, and are familiar with the methods used
by special services and "technical novelties". We are able to reveal shadowing or bugging, mail cover or breaking into our computers. "Competent bodies" sometimes work so
incompetently, especially at border crossing points, that their "special attention" is easily noticeable. In response to our requests to higher authorities we obtain formal replies that
sometimes contain an undisguised lie, signed by high-ranking officials...
We know who may stand behind this. Someone is probably unaware that a professional analyst does not need to read secret or top secret documents, or break into locked rooms:
there is enough open information to make grounded assessments and forecasts. We know not only our duties but also our rights and how to secure them. Non-governmental
centres present an important element of civil society, they should not be viewed as an opposition that dreams of "attacking" the Government or selling state secrets. It's better to
channel limited resources to fight corruption that has paralysed the entire country, and to monitor dubious foreign trade transactions where the country loses billions. This will be
good for the authorities and for the entire nation.
- And, finally, the traditional question about your plans for the future.
- To work, while there is enough health and power...
Publication source Contact the web-site editor
If you notice a mistake, you may notify us by highlighting it and hitting Ctrl-Enter.
Cl
ick
 to
 bu
y N
OW
!
PD
F-XChange
w
ww.docu-track
.co
m C
lic
k t
o b
uy
 N
OW
!
PD
F-XChange
w
ww.docu-track
.co
m
